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The Theory of Honest Signalling This is an old version of the
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Honest signalling in biology
Zahavi's handicap principle
Grafen's model
Attracting mates
Begging for food
Deterring predation
Contesting resources
Autumn color
Honest signalling in economics
Conspicuous consumption
Education
The mathematics of honest signalling
Signalling as a game
Other resources
Contact Information
Department of Zoology |
The Basic Solution: Costly Signals How can honest communication be ensured despite conflicting interests between a signaller and a signal receiver? In both biology and economics, a number of authors recognized that there may be a connection between the cost of signals and the reliability or honesty of signals. This lead to a suggestion for a possible solution to the problem of honest communication despite conflicting interests. Loosely paraphrased, the solution typically took something of the following form.
Of course, this solution left open many questions. What sort of mechanisms, biological or economic, would make lies cost more than honest signals? Do all signals have to be costly, or can honest signals be free? How much must lies cost in order for signalling to remain honest? Will individuals that use costly signals necessarily be better off than agents that simply decide not to communiate? In the sections that follow, we explore these and other questions. We will begin by looking at costly signals in biology. Later, we will consider examples from economics. [ Previous Page ] [ Next Page ]
Last modified September 4, 2002 |